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Abstract
A well established belief both in the game-theoretic IO and in pol-
icy debates is that market concentration facilitates collusion. We show
that this piece of conventional wisdom relies upon the assumption of
prot-seeking behaviour, for it may be reversed when rms pursue
other plausible goals. To illustrate our intuition, we investigate the
incentives to tacit collusion in an industry formed by Labor-Managed
(LM) enterprises. We characterize the perfect equilibrium of a su-
pergame in which LM rms play an innitely repeated Cournot game.
We show that the critical threshold of the discount factor above which
collusion is stable (i) is lower in the LM industry than in the capital-
istic one; (ii) monotonically decreases with the number of rms.
Keywords: cartel stability, labour-managed rms, repeated game
JEL Classication: L1, L3, C7
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1 Introduction
It is well widely accepted from both the industrial organization literature
(Tirole, 1988) and policy reports (Ivaldi et al., 2003) that high market con-
centration is a facilitating factor for (tacit as well as explicit) collusion. In
addition to coordination being likely more di¢ cult in larger groups, the in-
tuition that the incentive to collusion shrinks with too many competitors is
fairly simple.
Since rms must share the collusive prot, as the number of rms in-
creases each rm gets a lower share of the pie. This has two implications.
First, the gain from deviating increases for each rm since, by undercutting
the collusive price, a rm can steal market shares from all its competitors;
that is, having a smaller share each rm would gain more from capturing the
entire market. Second, for each rm the long-term benet of maintaining
collusion is reduced, precisely because it gets a smaller share of the collusive
prot. Thus the short-run gain from deviation increases, while at the same
time the long-run benet of maintaining collusion is reduced. It is thus more
di¢ cult to prevent rms from deviating.(Ivaldi et al., 2003, p. 12)
The entire argument is put forward in terms of prots. However, many
industries host also rms interested in other goals. Publicly owned rms
and cooperative (sometimes labeled as Labor-Managed) rms are the most
relevant instances of such non-prot seeking organizations. The question we
address in this paper deals precisely with the relationship between rms
maximand and tacit collusion. Even more precisely, what happens in a re-
peated game when rms maximize goals other than prots? Do properties
holding under prot-seeking behaviour still hold true in another plausible
setting?
Among the rms that are supposed to care about goals other than prof-
its, we shall consider the so-called Labor-Managed (LM) rms, sometimes
dened as cooperatives or workersrms. Their presence is important in
many countries and their performance is still under scrutiny by scholars and
practitioners.1 Moreover, in many European countries we are observing a
1See Perotin (2012) for an excellent survey and a rich bibliography.
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resurgence of interest in cooperative rms because they seem to perform
better than conventional rms in responding to the long slump (Delbono
and Reggiani, 2013). Moreover, when looking at industries where LM oper-
ate, one sees that they usually cohabit with prot maximizing rms (mixed
oligopolies) and sometimes LM are responsible for substantial fractions of
the overall industrial output.
Since Wards (1958) seminal paper, most of the theoretical literature
on cooperative rms has modeled them as agents maximizing surplus per
worker/member.2 If the rm does not a¤ect the wage rate, this amounts
to maximize the prot per worker. If the working time per worker is xed,
under perfect competition, Word proved that the co-ops supply function is
decreasing in output price. Such celebrated result is well-known as the per-
verse e¤ectof the cooperative rm. Moreover, this type of rms responds
strangely also to increases in xed costs; while the prot-maximizing rm
shrinks output in such an event, the co-op expands its output. Similar re-
sults have been proved also under monopoly by Gal-Or et al. (1980) and
Ireland and Law (1982).
Hill and Waterson (1983) are probably the rst to study an oligopolistic
industry formed by workers rms only. They prove that the Cournot equilib-
rium of such an industry is associated with a lower level of total output (and
higher price) that the corresponding entrepreneurial (i.e., prot-maximizing)
industry. Since then, the literature on LM rms in pure or mixed oligopolies
has been growing rapidly,3 but to the best of our knowledge all models assume
non-cooperative behavior by all participants.4
2To be more precise, the short run objective function of such rms is taken as revenue,
net of xed costs, per worker. Sertel (1982) denes as workersenterprise the case in
which workers coincide with members of LM rm.
3To the best of our knowledge, the rst papers modelling explicitly oligopolistic inter-
action between labour-managed rms and capitalistic rms are Horowitz (1991), Cremer
and Cremer (1992) and Delbono and Rossini (1992).
4The only exception is Ohnishi (2012). He models a two-stage game in which LM rms
choose whether to o¤er a donative most-favored nation policy in the rst stage and then
compete in prices. The kind of questions addressed in this paper makes its conclusions not
comparable with ours. At any rate, Ohnishi does not investigate the relationship between
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The paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in Section 2. Sec-
tion 3 presents the benchmark case of implicit collusion among Cournottian
prot-maximisers. Section 4 models the repeated game among LM rms and
establishes our core results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The setup
Consider a market for a homogeneous good, served by N = 1; 2; :::n identical
rms, all endowed with the same technology. Let the market exist over
discrete time t = 0; 1; 2; :::1: In any period, the inverse market demand
function is p = a   Q; Q = Pni=1 qi: The only variable input is labour, and
rm is output is qi = li; where li is the amount of labour employed in rm
i and  > 0.5 Hence, choosing li is equivalent to choosing qi; and the game
can be thought of as being a Cournot one. Let the unit wage be w 2 (0; a) :
Additionally, each rm has to bear an exogenous xed cost F > 0 (say, a
production license) to operate at any t.
In the remainder, we shall consider two alternative scenarios, in which
all rms are either entrepreneurial prot-seeking units, or labour-managed
enterprises. In the rst case, each of them sets li so as to maximise its prots
i = (p  w) qi   F = 
 
a  li   
X
j 6=i
lj   w
!
li   F (1)
In the second case, each rm sets li in order to maximise its value added per
worker/member
vi =
pqi   F
li
=


a  li   
P
j 6=i lj

li   F
li
(2)
Clearly, if vi < w, workers do prefer to quit and o¤er their labour to capital-
istic rms.
market concentration and collusive strategies.
5If Li is the number of workers (coinciding with the number of members) in rm i and
`i is the number of hours worked per person in the same rm, then li = Li`i: Therefore,
any variation in li might be due to a variation of either Li or `i; or both.
4
In both cases, the fully noncooperative Nash equilibria of the constituent
subgame are easily characterised. Consider rst the population of prot
seekers. The relevant rst order condition (FOC) is
@i
@li
= 
"
a  
 
2li +
X
j 6=i
lj
!#
  w = 0 (3)
Imposing symmetry on choice variables, the above FOC simplies as follows:
 [a   (n+ 1) l]  w = 0 (4)
which yields lN = (a   w) =

(n+ 1) 2

; where superscript N stands for
Nash equilibrium, while subscript  stands for prot-seeking. The resulting
individual equilibrium prots are
N =

a2   (n+ 1)2 F  2   (2a   w)w
(n+ 1)2 2
(5)
If instead all rms are labour-managed rms, the individual FOC is
@vi
@li
=
F
l2i
  2 = 0 (6)
so that lNLM =
p
F=; with the subscript LM revealing that we are looking
at a labour-managed unit.6 The value added at the Nash equilibrium is
vNLM =
h
a  (n+ 1)pF
i
.
It is intuitively true that shrinking li by all rms would increase both
prots and the value added; hence, the industry might exploit the repetition
of the constituent game over an innite horizon so as to build up an implicit
cartel, if rmstime preferences allow them to do so. Let  2 [0; 1] measure
the discount factor, taken to be common to all rms and time-invariant. In
the remainder, we will characterise the stability condition for full collusion
along the monopoly frontier in both scenarios, using the perfect folk theorem
(Friedman, 1971) with grim trigger strategies.
6From (4) and (6), it transpires that the second order condition for a maximum is
clearly met in both cases.
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3 Tacit collusion among prot-seekers
The implicit cartel sets the vector l  fl1; l2; :::lng to maximise full monopoly
prots M =
Pn
i=1 i; so that the relevant FOC writes as follows:
@
@li
=
@i
@li
+
X
j 6=i
@j
@li
= 0 (7)
At the symmetric collusive equilibrium, lC = (a   w) =
 
2n2

and the in-
dividual share of cartel (monopoly) prots is
M =
M
n
=
[a2   4nF ] 2   (2a   w)w
4n2
> N (8)
The optimal unilateral deviation from the cartel path, lD
 
lC

; solves
@D
 
lC

@lD (lC )
= 

a    2lD + (n  1) lC   w = 0, (9)
lD
 
lC

=
(n+ 1) (a   w)
4n2
so that deviation prots are
D
 
lC

=
2

a2 (n+ 1)2   16Fn2  w (n+ 1)2 (2a   w)
16n22
(10)
In the perfect folk theorem (Friedman, 1971), the punishment triggered by
any deviation from the collusive path is the innite Nash reversion involving
prots N forever. The resulting minimum value of the discount factor above
which full collusion is stable is
 =
D
 
lC
  M
D (lC )  N
=
(n+ 1)2
1 + n (n+ 6)
(11)
It is then easily veried that  in (11) is concave and monotonically increas-
ing in n.7
7It can also be checked that  = 9=17 when n = 2; which is the standard result
reported in textbook examples where duopoly is usually taken as benchmark.
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The foregoing analysis boils down to a well know claim, which is a syn-
thesis of the acquired wisdom on the e¤ect of cartel size on the stability of
implicit collusion among prot-seekers:
Proposition 1 A tacit cartel made up by n prot-seeking rms becomes pro-
gressively more unstable as n increases.
The intuitive explanation behind Proposition 1 is that, as n grows larger,
the individual share of cartel prots shrinks monotonically and therefore
implicit collusion becomes harder to sustain (cf. Tirole, 1988; and Ivaldi et
al. 2003, inter alia).
4 Tacit collusion among labour-managed rms
Now suppose the cartel is made up by n LM rms. If so, the tacit cartel sets
the vector l  fl1; l2; :::lng to maximise V M =
Pn
i=1 vi; so that the relevant
FOC writes as follows:
@V M
@li
=
@vi
@li
+
X
j 6=i
@vj
@li
= 0 (12)
The symmetric tacitly collusive equilibrium is lCLM =
p
F= (
p
n) and the
corresponding individual rms value added is
vM =

a  2
p
nF

 > vN (13)
The optimal unilateral deviation from the cartel path, lD
 
lCLM

; solves
@vD
 
lCLM

@lD (lCLM)
= 0, lD  lCLM = pF = lNLM (14)
since LM rmsreaction functions are orthogonal to each other. The unilat-
eral deviation payo¤ is
vD
 
lCLM

=
h
a
p
n  (pn (2 +pn)  1)pF
i

p
n
(15)
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which is higher than vM appearing in (13). Under the grim trigger strategies
of the perfect folk theorem (Friedman, 1971), the critical threshold for cartel
stability is
LM =
vD
 
lCLM
  vM
vD (lCLM)  vN
=
1
1 +
p
n
(16)
which is evidently convex and monotonically decreasing in n. Hence, the
analysis of the supergame among LM rms reveals the following:
Proposition 2 An increase in cartel size makes implicit collusion among
labour-managed rms easier to sustain.
Proof. It su¢ ces to observe that the derivative of LM = 1= (1 +
p
n) w.r.t.
n is negative everywhere.
The interpretation of Proposition may benet from some algebra. To
evaluate the e¤ect of a change in n on the sustainability of implicit collusion
among LM rms, let us rewrite the above critical threshold of the discount
factor as
LM (n) =
vD
 
lCLM ; n
  vM (n)
vD (lCLM ; n)  vN (n)
(17)
Treating n as a continuous variable, we have that
sign

@ (LM (n))
@n

= (18)
sign

@vD ()
@n
  @v
M ()
@n
 
vD ()  vN ()
 

@vD ()
@n
  @v
N ()
@n
 
vD ()  vM ()
We already know that vD () > vM () > vN () : We must establish the sign
of
@vD ()
@n
  @v
M ()
@n
(19)
and
@vD ()
@n
  @v
N ()
@n
(20)
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Concerning (19), we have
@vD ()
@n
  @v
M ()
@n
=
 (n  1)pF
2n
p
n
> 0 (21)
As for (20), we have
@vD ()
@n
  @v
N ()
@n
=
 (2n
p
n  n  1)pF
2n
p
n
> 0 (22)
Therefore, @LM=@n < 0 as a result of
@vD () =@n  @vN () =@n
vD ()  vN () >
@vD () =@n  @vM () =@n
vD ()  vM () (23)
Inequality (23) compares the rates at which the numerator and denom-
inator of LM change as n varies. What (23) says is that the denominator
of LM increases in n more rapidly than its numerator; hence, 

LM declines
as n grows. With LM rms we then obtain a reversal of the standard con-
clusion holding under prot-maximising behaviour which is summarised by
@=@n > 0 since, from (11), we have:
@D () =@n  @N () =@n
D ()  N () <
@D () =@n  @M () =@n
D ()  M () (24)
Then, we may claim
Proposition 3 If the intensity of the punishment increases in n more (resp.,
less) rapidly than the incentive to deviate from the cartel, then the critical
threshold of the discount factor decreases (resp., increases) monotonically in
the number of cartel members.
It is worth investigating the curvature and the limit properties of both
LM and 

. Simple algebra shows that
@2LM
@n2
=
3
p
n+ 1
4n (
p
n+ 1)
3p
n
> 0 (25)
@2
@n2
=  8 [n
3   3 (n+ 2)]
[n (n+ 6) + 1]3
< 0 (26)
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for all n > 2. Moreover,
limn!1 

LM = 0
limn!1 

 = 1
(27)
In words, the critical threshold for LM rms is decreasing and convex in n
and tends to zero as n becomes arbitrarily large. On the other hand, the
critical threshold for prot-seeking rms is increasing and concave in n and
tends to one as n becomes arbitrarily large. To complete the description of
the behaviour of the critical thresholds w.r.t. n, we may also observe that
LM jn=2 =
1
1 +
p
2
<
9
17
= jn=2 (28)
Figure 1 below illustrates the above properties of the critical levels of the
discount factors.
Figure 1: Tacit collusion in the space (n; ).
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-

n
LM

1
(2; 0)
The properties we have just highlighted take us to our nal result, accord-
ing to which tacit collusion is more likely to be expected in an LM industry
than in a capitalistic one.
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Proposition 4  > 

LM for all n  2:
The intuition behind Proposition 4 relies upon the di¤erence in rmsob-
jective functions. To be more precise, while prot seekers aim at maximising
total prots, LM rms maximise prot per worker/member. Therefore, as
n grows, the incentive to collude intensies for LM rms while the opposite
occurs for prot-seeking units.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have shown that the relationship between cartel stability
and cartel size depends upon rmsgoals. While under prot-maximising be-
haviour expanding cartel size diminishes cartel stability, the opposite applies
if rms maximise individual value added. Therefore, under the same con-
ditions concerning demand and technology, we should expect tacit collusion
occurring more likely in an LM industry than in a capitalistic one.
We believe that our model might fruitfully be extended in a few directions
which we are currently exploring. The rst one amounts to considering price
instead of quantity as rmschoice variable in a di¤erentiated oligopoly. The
second consists in replacing the perpetual Nash reversion with one-shot stick
and carrot optimal punishments à la Abreu (1986). The third amounts to
considering an industry in which prot-seeking and LM rms cohabit, and
scrutinising the emergence of tacit collusion in such a mixed oligopoly.
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